Abstract-Fine grained information flow monitoring can in principle address a wide range of security and privacy goals, for example in web applications. But it is very difficult to achieve sound monitoring with acceptable runtime cost and sufficient precision to avoid impractical restrictions on programs and policies. We present a systematic technique for design of monitors that are correct by construction. It encompasses policies with downgrading. The technique is based on abstract interpretation which is a standard basis for static analysis of programs. This should enable integration of a wide range of analysis techniques, enabling more sophisticated engineering of monitors to address the challenges of precision and scaling to widely used programming languages.
I. INTRODUCTION
Runtime monitoring can serve to test a program's security or to ensure its security by detecting violations. Monitoring is a good fit for access control policies, which are safety properties. A run either does or does not satisfy the policy, and a monitor can be precise in the sense of raising an alert only when the run is poised to violate the policy. Information flow policies are about dependency, e.g., an untrusted (resp. secret) input should not influence a trusted (resp. public) output. Formal definitions of information flow (IF) security are "hyperproperties" [25] involving multiple runs. Suppose an observer classified as "low" knows the code, the set of possible secret inputs, and the low input (from which they can deduce the possible runs and low outputs). A policy specifies what can be learned about the secret upon observing a particular low output. Learning means determining a smaller set of possible values of the secret. How is a monitor, acting only on the actual execution, to detect violations of a property defined with respect to all (pairs of) runs? Remarkably, this was shown to be possible [41] . In this paper we show how to design such monitors systematically.
A popular way to monitor dependency is to tag secret data and propagate tags whenever tagged data is involved in computing other data. If an output is not tagged, we might conclude that in all possible runs, the output would have the same value, i.e., nothing has been learned about the secret. The conclusion is wrong, owing to information channels besides data flow. The most pervasive and exploitable such channel is control flow. If some branch condition depends on a secret, the low observer may learn the secret from the absence of an observable action that happens in the other branch.
Owing to the possibility of such implicit flow, sound monitors are not in general precise. A simple technique is to raise an alert if a low assignment is attempted in a high branch, yielding false positives in cases like this: if inhi then outlo := 0 else outlo := 0. Another technique which has been investigated extensively is to rely on static analysis to determine which locations might have been updated in executions that do not follow the same branch as the actual execution. The monitor tags all such locations when the control join point is reached. These techniques provide monitoring that is provably sound with respect to idealized semantics that ignores covert channels like timing (e.g., [9] , [15] , [41] , [51] , [55] ).
These and related techniques have been investigated and implemented but had quite limited practical impact. One obvious reason is the difficulty of specifying policies with sufficient flexibility to capture security goals without excessive restriction. Another impediment to practical use is that keeping track of possible alternate control paths has high performance cost. Lowering precision to reduce cost can result in intolerably many false positives. It is an active area of research to improve monitors for better performance, better precision, and more subtle policies. (See Section VI for related work.)
Another impediment to practical IF monitoring is that, if enough is at stake to motivate paying the costs of policy specification, performance degradation, and possible false positives, there should be high assurance of correctness. The complexity of monitoring grows with the complexity of the programming language and the monitoring techniques. While there are machine-checked correctness proofs for theoretical models, there are few for practical implementations. The proofs known to us have been done "from scratch", rather than building on and reusing prior results (though of course one can identify common techniques). Such proofs are not easily maintained as the monitored language and platform evolves. This paper addresses the impediments related to the precision of monitors as well as the complexity of their design and correctness proofs.
For safety properties, the theory of abstract interpretation [29] is well established and widely used to guide and validate the design of static analyses [30] . Like the best theories in engineering, abstract interpretation allows designs to be derived from their specification instead of merely helping to justify them after the fact [27] . Abstract interpretation underlies the static analysis part of some IF monitors [16] , [45] , but the monitor design and justification remains ad hoc. Abstract interpretation has also been used for static analysis of noninterference [39] .
Chudnov et al. [23] suggest that an IF monitor should be viewed as computing an abstract interpretation to account for alternate runs vis-à-vis the monitored run. The key observation is that typical IF policies are 2-safety [25] : a violation has the form of a pair of runs, so the monitored run (major run) need only be checked with respect to each alternate (minor run) individually. What needs to be checked about the minor run is a safety property, defined in terms of the major run (and thus fully known to the monitor only upon completion of the major run). This view offers a path to more sophisticated monitoring and systematic development of monitors for real world languages and platforms, and modular machine checked correctness proofs. But the paper [23] is devoid of Galois connections or other trappings of abstract interpretation! It offers only a rational reconstruction of an existing monitor for the simple while language, augmented with downgrading and intermediate release policies.
Contribution: ideal monitor We reformulate the idea of "tracking set" in Chudnov et al. [23] as a novel variation of the standard notion of collecting semantics [28] , which serves as specification for-and basis for deriving-static analyses. We generalize collecting semantics to depend on the major run, in an ideal monitor which we prove embodies checking of noninterference for the major execution. Contribution: derived monitors We derive several monitors from the monitoring semantics, using techniques of abstract interpretation to show the monitors are correct by construction. That is, the definitions are obtained by calculation, disentangling routine steps from inventive steps and design choices, inspired by Cousot [27] . We identify two main ways in which a monitor can glean information from the major run and the abstractly interpreted collective minor runs, accounting for existing monitors as well as showing the way to further advances that can be made in precision and efficiency. A key abstraction used in our monitors is one for relational formulas as in [23] , here formulated as a Galois connection. In the cited paper, the derived monitor exhibits ad hoc features that reflect implementation details, e.g., simple agreement relations are represented both by taint tags on variables and by formulas. Here we refrain from dwelling on implementation and instead explore how some existing static analyses can be used in monitoring with little or no change. For example, one of our monitors uses an interval analysis, known to have good performance in practice. Other analyses, like constant propagation could as well be incorporated, as we discuss. As in standard static analysis, the notion of reduced product [26] , [29] , [35] serves to share information between different analyses, increasing their precision and efficiency.
These first steps are a proof of principle. In the future, solid theoretical underpinnings can enable aggressive engineering of monitors while retaining high assurance.
Outline: Sec. II introduces the simple language used to present our ideas, and reviews key notions from abstract interpretation, especially collecting semantics. For commands we choose standard denotational semantics, because it facilitates streamlined notations in what follows. Sec. III presents the ideal monitor and shows how extant security policies are defined in terms of this semantics. Sec. IV defines a Galois connection for the lattice of relational formulas. That connection induces a specification of a monitor that approximates the ideal monitor. We sketch the derivation, from that specification, of a generic monitor. Sec. V derives several monitors, by refining the generic monitor to use different abstract interpretations for the minor runs. These include a new purely dynamic monitor as well as improvement on prior monitoring techniques. Sec. VI discusses related work. Sec. VII discusses ideas for monitoring richer languages and for gaining precision by leveraging existing static analyses.
A technical report, providing detailed proofs for all results, can be found on the authors' web pages.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Language syntax and standard semantics
To expose the main ideas it suffices to work with the simple imperative language with integer variables. The only nonstandard features are the annotation commands, assert and assume. These use relational formulas as in Chudnov et al. [23] , and are explained in due course.
Program syntax
Expressions are integer-valued. They include constants n, variables id, binary operators (indicated by ⊕), and boolean expressions b.
A state is a mapping from variables id to values v ∈ Z. For σ ∈ States we define the denotation e σ of an expression e as usual. For example, id σ σ(id). Boolean expressions evaluate to either integer 0 or 1, e.g., ¬b σ is 1 if b σ = 0. We omit the details, which are standard, and for simplicity we assume that every expression has a value in every state.
We define the set of outcomes States ⊥ States ∪ {⊥} where ⊥ is distinct from proper states (representing divergence). We denote by the approximation partial order over the flat domain States ⊥ , and˙ its lifting to functions over outcomes. Therefore, the denotation of a command c is a function c ∈ States ⊥ → States ⊥ For background on denotational semantics, see [57] .
The clause c ⊥ ⊥ indicates that c is ⊥-strict for all c and we ignore ⊥ in the subsequent cases. The annotation commands act like skip. In the clause for if/else, we confuse 1 and 0 with truth and falsity in the metalanguage, to avoid writing b σ = 1 etc. Throughout this paper, we denote the least fixpoint of a monotonic function f ∈ A → A that is -greater than x ∈ A by lfp x f .
Standard semantics of commands
where
B. Relational formulas
Relational formulas relate two states. The agreement formula Ax says the two states have the same value for x. In relational logics, initial and final agreements indicate which variables are "low", as in the low-indistinguishability relations used to define noninterference [1] . In this paper we internalize specifications using annotation commands as in [23] . Given a command c, consider the command assume Ax, Ay; c; assert Az
This expresses that the final value of z may depend on the initial values of x and y but not on other variables. If, from two states that agree on x and y, executions of c lead to different values of z, the assertion will fail. Assumptions at intermediate points in the program serve to specify downgrading, similar to explicit code annotations in some work [21] , [47] , [48] . Although we do not model intermediate output as such, one may model an output channel as a variable, say out; the policy that it is low can be specified by asserting agreement over what is assigned to out.
Relational formulas also feature a "holds in both" operator: Two states σ and τ satisfy Bb iff. they both evaluate the conditional expression b to 1. The third basic form is conditional agreement [2] , [23] , Bb ⇒ Ae, which can be used to encode multilevel security policies as well as to encode conditional downgrading (e.g., [11] , [20] ). Relational formulas are closed under conjunction, written Φ, Ψ as a reminder that sometimes we abuse notation and treat a relational formula as a set of basic formulas.
C. Collecting semantics and abstract interpretation
Usually, abstract interpretation-based static analyses introduce a collecting semantics (also known as a static semantics [28, Section 4]) aimed at formalizing the possible behaviours of a program wrt. a property of interest. This serves as a starting point for the derivation of sound approximate representations of program behaviours. The collecting semantics lifts the standard semantics to apply to arbitrary sets of proper states, ignoring the ⊥ outcome that indicates divergence because -like most work on information flow monitoringwe aim for termination-insensitive security [19] .
The powerset P(States), with set inclusion as a partial order, is a complete lattice. The collecting semantics can be given a direct definition that makes explicit the fixpoint computation over a set of states, rather than relying on the underlying fixpoint of the functional F used in the standard semantics of while.
Collecting semantics
The displayed equations define the same semantics as Equation (2) .
The proof is by structural induction on commands. In case C is P(States) and A is some lattice of abstract states, a sound approximation for command c is t ∈ A → A such that the following holds (writing˙ for the pointwise lift of ):
The best abstract transformer for c is α • {|c| } • γ. It is not computable, in general, but it serves to specify the abstract interpretation t. The idea is to derive an abstract semantics {| − | } so that, for all c, {|c| } is a sound approximation of c and can be implemented efficiently.
III. IDEAL MONITOR
We introduce a concrete monitoring semantics which serves as basis to define the security property by interpreting annotation commands with respect to both the actual execution (major run) and all possible alternatives (minor runs). Readers familiar with Chudnov et al. [23] may see this as a principled account of their notion of "tracking set", adapted to denotational semantics. Sections IV and V derive monitors as abstract interpretations of this ideal monitor.
The main difference between the collecting semantics and the ideal monitor is that the ideal monitor is parametrised by the current state σ of the major run -we call this a major state. The ideal monitor is responsible for interpreting annotation commands in order to track and verify the relational formulas satisfied by all minor states τ in the tracking set Σ, wrt. the major state σ.
The ideal monitor also has to signal security violations due to assertion failures. We use the term fault, denoted by . We define P (States) P(States) ∪ { }. Therefore, the ideal monitor
is applied to the initial major state and maps an input tracking set Σ to an output set Σ or fault . We also introduce only one rule ( c σ ) to mean that the ideal monitor maps fault to fault.
In order to use the framework of abstract interpretation, we provide the set P (States) with a lattice structure. To this end, we lift set inclusion, the natural partial order over the powerset P(States), to the set P (States). Therefore, we let be the top element of the set P (States) and we denote by the lifting of set inclusion ⊆ to the set P (States):
Let denote the lifting of set union to the set P (States).
The ideal monitor relies on the collecting semantics for branching commands. Therefore, we also lift the collecting semantics to the set P (States), by letting {|c| } . This guarantees that both the ideal monitor and the collecting semantics are monotonic.
The ideal monitor can be seen as a hybrid monitor comprised of a dynamic part and a static part. It directly handles the dynamic part, but delegates the static part to the collecting semantics. The dynamic part consists of tracking the minor states that follow the same execution path as the major state, whereas the static part consists in tracking the minor states that follow a different execution path. The monitor semantics of conditional commands best illustrates the intertwining between the dynamic and static part of this ideal monitor. When the major state evaluates the conditional guard to true, the monitoring semantics continues tracking all minor states that also evaluate the guard to true. As for the minor states that evaluate the conditional guard to false, they are propagated through the else-branch by the collecting semantics. Notice that the monitor semantics of conditionals ignores annotation commands in non-executed branches. We revisit this later.
Ideal monitor
For assume Φ, the ideal monitor reduces the initial tracking set Σ to the set of minor states τ whose pairing with the major state σ satisfy the relational formula Φ. The monitor rules out all alternative executions on the same control path that do not comply with the assumption Φ. These are termed "assumption failures" in [23] .
For assert Φ, the ideal monitor checks whether all minor states in the initial tracking set Σ satisfy the relational formula Φ when paired with the current major state σ. If so, the monitor returns Σ. Otherwise, the monitor concludes that one of the alternative executions -that satisfies all assumptions encountered so far -falsifies the assertion when paired with the major state. So the semantics signals a security violation by returning fault .
For while loops, the ideal monitor is defined as the least fixpoint of a functional G that formalises the simultaneous evaluation on both the major state and the tracking set. Erasing operations related to tracking sets in the functional G yields the functional F used in the standard denotational semantics. Along the iteration of the major state on the loop body, the ideal monitor iterates the tracking set on a conditional -ensuring only minor states that have not yet reached a fixpoint go through an additional iteration of the loop body. When the major state reaches a fixpoint (i.e. ¬ b σ), the tracking set is fed to the collecting semantics before exiting the loop -ensuring all minor states reach their fixpoint.
Like the collecting semantics, the ideal monitor is defined over concrete executions. Therefore, there is no loss of information, in the sense that the ideal monitor returns a fault iff. there is a minor state that falsifies the assertion.
The semantics of the ideal monitor is the concrete specification for a more abstract monitor whose transfer functions are computable. We will rely on the framework of abstract interpretation in order to derive sound monitors by approximating both the concrete collecting semantics and the ideal monitor.
The ideal monitor and the collecting semantics are equivalent for annotation-free commands, as long as the major run terminates.
Lemma 2 . For all annotation-free commands c, all σ ∈ States such that c σ = ⊥, and all sets Σ ⊆ States, it holds that
In fact c σ Σ ⊆ {|c| }Σ as long as c is assertion-free. The proof is by structural induction.
If the major run diverges, the least fixpoint of the functional G yields an undefined outcome ⊥, paired with an empty set ∅ of minor states.
Assuming a set in of variables considered low inputs, and a set out considered low outputs, let us use the notation Ain and Aout to abbreviate the conjunction of basic agreements for these variables. Theorem 1 states that, for c annotated following the pattern of Equation (1), the ideal monitor, parametrised with a major state σ 1 , does not result in a fault iff. the standard notion of termination-insensitive noninterference (TINI) holds for c and σ 1 . Theorem 1 . Let in and out be two sets of variables and c be an annotation-free command. Let commandĉ be defined as assume Ain; c ; assert Aout. For all σ 1 , σ 1 ∈ States such that c σ 1 = σ 1 , we have ĉ σ1 States = iff.
Here we write = in to indicate agreement on the variables in.
The security property in [23] allows intermediate annotations, but disallows them in high branches, to ensure robustness of declassification etc. In an Appendix we provide an alternative ideal monitor and an alternative collecting semantics, both of which fault if an assertion or assumption occurs in a high conditional -one for which some minor states do not agree with the major state on its conditional guard.
Strong conjecture: for terminating executions, the security property in [23] holds iff. the alternative ideal monitor does not fault.
The alternative ideal monitor is a simple variation, but with the notational complication of threading an additional parameter through the definitions. So we do not use it in the body of the paper. However, for each of the derived monitors, there is a very similar one derived from the alternate ideal monitor, and therefore sound with respect to the security property in [23] .
In summary, the idea is that from an initial state σ, a monitored execution evaluates c σ and in parallel should evaluate an abstraction of c σ , written c σ . The monitored execution yields σ , with c σ = σ , if it can guarantee that c σ States = . Otherwise, there is a potential security violation. This parallel evaluation can be formalized, as it is in the functional G for the monitor semantics of loops, but to streamline notation in the rest of the paper we focus on what is returned by the ideal monitor.
IV. LATTICE OF RELATIONAL FORMULAS
The derived monitors use abstract interpretations based on relational formulas. This section defines the abstraction and uses it to derive a generic monitor that is refined in Section V.
First we define the lattice of relational formulas. To make it finite, expressions in relational formulas are restricted to those that occur in the program to be monitored, as well as their negations to facilitate precision in the monitors we derive.
A set of formulas is interpreted conjunctively. To streamline notation we confuse a conjunctive formula, say "Ax, Ay", with the set {Ax, Ay}. That is why the lattice is defined in terms of basic formulas.
Lattice of relational formulas L P (L)
Assumption: for a given command c, let L be a finite set of basic relational formulas that is closed under negation of boolean expressions and which contains at least Bb, Ae, and Bb ⇒ Ae for every b and e that occur in c. We use the powerset P(L) as a lattice ordered by ⊇ with ∅ on top and intersection as join:
be the lifting of the partial order ⊇ such that is the top element of the lattice P (L):
We also let (resp. ) denote the lifting of set intersection ∩ (resp. the lifting of set union ∪) to the lattice P (L).
The notation elides dependence of L on c because c should be the main program to be monitored; a fixed L will be used in the context of the monitor semantics which is recursively applied to sub-programs of c.
The monitor will maintain an over-approximation of the relational formulas satisfied by the major state σ and every minor state τ of interest. A set of formulas is interpreted to mean all the formulas hold for every such pair (σ, τ ). The empty set indicates no relations are known, whereas serves to indicate that some required relation fails to hold.
Given a major state σ, we aim to define an approximation of a tracking set Σ, in order to account for relational formulas satisfied by the major state σ and each minor state τ ∈ Σ. Subsequently, we lift this abstraction in order to approximate the monitoring collecting semantics and obtain sound computable abstract transfer functions of a monitor tracking relational formulas. We formalise this abstraction of the tracking set Σ as a function α σ that is parametrised by a state σ:
The associated concretisation function γ σ is also parametrised by a major state σ. The concretisation of a set Δ ∈ P(L) of relational formulas yields a set Σ of minor states, such that every minor state τ ∈ Σ and the major state σ satisfy all relational formulas Φ ∈ Δ. Figure 1 illustrates the best abstraction of the monitoring collecting semantics c σ . If a set Σ of minor states is abstracted wrt. a major state σ by a set Δ of relational formulas (Σ γ σ (Δ)), then the resulting set Σ = c σ Σ of minor states is abstracted wrt. the resulting major state σ = c σ by the set
is not computable in general. An abstract interpretation c σ is sound if it satisfies the following condition:
Note that we denote by˙ (resp.˙ ) the pointwise lifting to functions of the partial order over P (States) (resp. of the partial order over P (L)).
Lemma 4 Soundness conditions. Consider any c, σ, σ such that σ = c σ. Equation (4) is equivalent to each of the following:
In the process of deriving a sound abstract monitoring semantics c σ approximating the monitoring collecting semantics c σ , we also have to derive a sound abstract static semantics {|c| } ∈ P (L) → P (L) approximating the static collecting semantics {|c| } ∈ P (States) → P (States). Equation (3) provides a notion of soundness for static semantics, whereas Equation (4) provides a notion of soundness for monitoring semantics. While approximating the monitoring collecting semantics, we will find good ways for the abstract static and monitoring semantics to interact. In particular, the abstract static analyses we propose will account for that interaction by additional parameters. Additionally, we will also prove soundness results in Lemmas 5, 6 and 9 that embody not only the soundness condition of Equation (3), but also variations on that property that take into account this interaction between the dynamic and static analyses.
The
c 1 σ is sound by induction hypothesis of Equation (4) 
The static analysis is sound:
The above derivation is a routine use of abstract interpretation techniques. The last step uses a soundness property for the static part of the monitor that is similar to Equation (3). So far, we relied on an approximation of the monitoring collecting semantics of command c 1 and an approximation of the static collecting semantics of command c 0 . To continue this generic derivation, we need to derive a sound approximation for the guard operators grd b σ and grd ¬b .
The approximation of grd b σ proceeds as follows:
= since the major state evaluates b to true
As for the approximation of grd b , we have:
To sum up, we rewrite the approximations of operators grd b σ and grd b of Equations (6) and (7) in the intermediate abstraction of conditionals obtained in Equation (5), so we can conclude:
This equation yields one of the generic approximations of conditional commands. It says that when the conditional guard is true, monitor the then branch and statically analyse the else branch.
In the following section, we specialise this generic approximation by relying on different approximations of the static collecting semantics.
Given the importance of relational formulas as an abstraction, it should be no surprise that some monitors rely on entailments among formulas. Precision can be improved by providing the monitor with strong means of logical deduction, but there is a cost in performance. This engineering trade-off can be left open, by just specifying what we need. We use the notation Δ ⇒ Φ, which is either true or false, as follows (cf. [23] ).
Approximate entailment
Δ ⇒ Φ Assumption: For any Δ, Φ, if Δ ⇒ Φ then the implication is valid. That is, for all σ, τ ∈ States, if σ τ |= Δ then σ τ |= Φ.
V. MONITOR DERIVATION
We derive three different monitors from the ideal monitoring semantics. By relying on the framework of abstract interpretation, these monitors are correct by construction. Unless it is clear from context, we will differentiate the three abstract semantics of these monitors by prefixing them with the letters D, M and I.
These three monitors illustrate different ways of reasoning about relational formulas in high branching commands. The first one treats high branching commands pessimistically by forgetting all known formulas. The second one relies on an approximation of the modified variables in order to determine which relational formulas cannot be falsified, a usual technique in hybrid monitors. The third one deduces new relational formulas by comparing the results of an interval value analysis to the current values in the monitored execution.
A. Purely-Dynamic Monitor
Let us start by deriving a purely-dynamic monitor tracking relational formulas. This monitor is an instance of EM mechanisms [54] . Thus, it must observe only the execution steps of the major state. In particular, this monitor should not look aside [51] , meaning that it does not rely on information about minor states that do not follow the same execution path as the major state. This scenario corresponds to approximating the collecting semantics {|c| } by an abstract static semantics D{|c| } that returns the top element of the lattice P(L), providing no information about minor states that do not follow the same execution path as the major state.
Definition 1 introduces such an abstract static semantics. We ensure it is strict by mapping the bottom element L of the lattice P(L) to itself. Definition 1 . The abstract static semantics D{|c| } for a purelydynamic monitor is given by:
Mapping L to L is sound because the bottom element L is concretised to the empty set of states (since L is closed under negation, thus it contains Bb and B¬b for some b).
A detailed derivation of the purely dynamic monitor, as well as subsequent derivations, are found in the accompanying technical report. Figure 2 presents the derived monitor. In it we use the notation Δ⇒ Φ for the approximate implication specified at the end of Section IV. The semantics for conditional commands is obtained from the generic derivation for conditionals, presented in Equation (8), by unfolding the definition of the static analysis D{|c| } .
The abstract monitoring semantics of any command maps fault to fault ( c σ ). For assignments id := e, the monitor invalidates all relational formulas that involve variable id. It also deduces that all resulting minor states agree with the major state on variable id, if Δ ⇒ Ae. For a sequence c 1 ; c 2 , the initial state σ is used to monitor c 1 , and then the resulting major state c 1 σ is used to monitor c 2 .
For assumptions, the monitor adds the assumed formula to the input set. For asserts, the monitor returns fault if it cannot determine that the known Δ implies the asserted Φ.
where For conditionals, if the monitor is unable to determine that all minor states agree with the major state on the value of the conditional guard, it must treat it as a "high conditional". So the purely-dynamic monitor conservatively forgets all known relational formulas.
Similarly to the standard denotational semantics and the ideal monitor semantics, the abstract monitoring semantics of loops is defined as a fixpoint of an abstract functional G . This abstract fixpoint behaves as a finite sequence of conditionals. To each iteration of the major state through the loop body corresponds a simultaneous iteration of the monitor on a conditional. It is important that the monitor treats each iteration of the loop body as a conditional, in order to soundly track formulas satisfied by minor states that exit the loop before the major state. When the major state exits the loop, the monitor relies on the static analysis in order to account for minor states that may continue iterating through the loop. Figure 2 is relatively efficient, at the cost of precision (i.e., it rejects many secure executions). However, notice that both purely-dynamic approaches are incomparable. Indeed, consider for instance the program in Listing 1 where only variable secret is high. An NSU approach would stop the program when the assignment to public is executed, signaling a possible security violation. In contrast, our purely dynamic monitor simply forgets all known relational formulas at the merge point of the conditional; in the case of simple agreements, this is tantamount to labelling all variables as high. Thus, at the assignment to variable y, our monitor deduces that all minor states agree with the major state on the value of y, which means that no security violation is raised since the relational assertion is satisfied. Notice that if this example program asserts Apublic instead of Ay, our monitor would always signal a violation , whereas a NSU approach would not signal a fault when the conditional guard evaluates to false (secret ≤ 0).
B. Hybrid Monitor with the Modified Variables
To achieve more precision, we need non-trivial static analysis to provide information about minor runs that do not follow the same execution path as the major run ("high branches"). The next monitor relies on an over-approximation of variables that are modified by a command.
Modifiable variables Mod
Assumption: Mod ∈ Com → P(V ar) satisfies the following: for all c, id, if there is σ with c σ = ⊥ and c σ(id) = σ(id) then id ∈ Mod(c).
For our simple language, the obvious implementation is to return the set of assignment targets. Instead of conservatively forgetting about all known relational formulas at the merge point of high conditionals, the monitor will be able to retain information about variables that are modified in neither conditional branches, similarly to existing hybrid monitors [41] , [51] .
Guided by the soundness condition, we derive an abstract static semantics that leverages modified variables.
Definition 2 . For all commands c and c , the abstract static semantics M{|c| } c for modified variables is given by:
The soundness condition is similar to Lemma 5, adapted to the extra parameter.
Lemma 6 soundness of M{| −
For a given set Δ of relational formulas that hold between an initial major state σ and every initial minor state τ ∈ Σ, this abstract static semantics deduces a set Δ of relational formulas that hold between an output major state σ = c σ and every output minor state τ = c τ . Intuitively, the set Δ is deduced from Δ by keeping only the relational formulas that cannot be falsified since their free variables are not modified. Figure 3 introduces the abstract semantics M c σ of the hybrid monitor relying on a static analysis of modified variables. Most transfer functions are essentially the same as the ones introduced for the purely-dynamic monitor. Thus, we refer to Figure 2 and redefine only the ones that are different, namely conditionals and loops. The main difference compared to the purely-dynamic monitor resides in the treatment of high branchings. For a high conditional, the abstract static analysis of modified variables enables the hybrid monitor to deduce that if a relational formula Φ holds before the conditional command and if its free variables are modified in neither conditional branches, then Φ also holds after the execution of the conditional command. This behaviour is similar to the treatment of high conditionals by existing hybrid information flow monitors [41] , [51] . However, our hybrid monitor does not rely on labelling the program counter with a security context in order to track implicit flows. This is similar to Besson et al.'s approach [16] ; it facilitates better precision, as they show and we see in the next subsection.
Theorem 3 soundness of M − − . The hybrid monitor M c σ is sound in the sense of Equation (4): for all c, σ:
The derivation proof of this monitor is similar to the derivation of the previous purely-dynamic monitor. It mostly leverages the abstract static analysis of Definition 2 and Lemma 6, in order to treat more precisely high branching commands.
Although we avoid relying on explicit tracking of a security context, for reasons of precision, that is useful for another purpose: enforcing security policies such as robust declassification [59] . Recall the strong conjecture following Theorem 1. One can replay the derivation of all three of our monitors, starting from the alternative ideal monitor in Appendix A, with minimal changes. We thus obtain three alternative monitors that track a security context and are conjectured to be sound for the semantics in [23] .
C. Hybrid Monitor with Intervals
We now derive a hybrid monitor that relies on a static analysis approximating the range of values each variable may take. This allows to infer agreements even for locations that are modified in high branches.
Interval analysis {| − | } ,Int
Assumptions: States Int is a set of abstract environments mapping variables to intervals (and States
Int
States
Int ∪ { }).
Int ) being the Galois connection enabling its derivation:
Interval static analysis is standard [28] ; we present one in full detail in the long version of the paper.
Unlike the previous hybrid monitor relying on the modified variables, this monitor reasons on the values variables may take, in order to establish relational formulas in the case of high branching commands. Similarly to the condition stated in Lemmas 5 and 6, the abstract static analysis {|c| } must satisfy:
Let us derive such an abstract static analysis by relying on the interval analysis {|c| } ,Int . Observe that
Consequently, we can leverage an interval static analysis to derive a monitor tracking relational formulas, provided that we derive an interface between the two abstractions. First, we have to approximate the operator α Int • γ σ which translates relational formulas -that holds wrt. a major state σ -to interval constraints over variables. Second, we need to approximate the operator α σ • γ Int which translates interval constraints over variables to relational formulas -that holds wrt. a major state σ . These two operators α Int • γ σ and α σ • γ Int are similar to Granger's reduced product operators [26] , [36] over the Cartesian product of both intervals and relational formulas, as we shall explain.
Since combining different static analyses independently by relying on a Cartesian product does not yield optimal results in general, abstract interpretation relies on a notion of a reduced products [29] , in order to enable the sharing of information between the different abstractions and gain more precision.
Let (α 
, parametrised by a state σ ∈ States and satisfying two conditions:
,Int ı and tofor σ (ı, Δ) Δ Lemma 7 . For all σ ∈ States, any pair of operators that is a Granger's reduced product (toint σ , tofor σ ) for the Cartesian abstraction States Int ×P (L) provides a sound approximation of the interface between intervals and relational formulas:
The proof of this result applies to any abstraction and is not limited to an interval analysis. In a nutshell, for any offthe-shelf static analysis, we can define a Granger's reduced product for its Cartesian product with the relational formulas in order to interface this analysis with our monitor, and guarantee soundness by Equation (9) . Therefore, we introduce in the following a pair of operators (toint σ , tofor σ ), that we prove defines a Granger's reduced product for the Cartesian product of intervals and relational formulas, in Lemma 8.
Lemma 8 . For all σ ∈ States, the pair of operators toint σ , tofor σ is a Granger's reduced product.
The proof derives the definition from the required properties. The operator toint σ reduces an interval environment ı by accounting for the additional constraint that a set of relational formulas must hold wrt. to a state σ. For instance, reducing ı to account for a set of constraints Δ amounts to computing the intersection over the reduced interval environments wrt. each formula Φ ∈ Δ. Also, reducing ı to account for the constraint that Ae holds wrt. to a major state σ amounts to reducing ı to account for the additional constraint that expression e evaluates to a particular value e σ that is determined by the major state σ. This reduction can be achieved by using an abstract operator grd guarantees the soundness of operator toint σ , and the abstract meet with the initial interval environment also guarantees the reduction condition stated in Definition 3.
The operator tofor σ reduces interval constraints over variables to a set of relational formulas that hold wrt. a major state σ. Whenever an interval environment ı maps a variable x to a singleton value that matches σ(x), we can deduce that all the minor states abstracted by ı agree with σ on the value of x.
Notice that tofor σ does not iterate over the finite lattice P(L), though in theory that can be done in order to determine all relational formulas that hold. A smarter way to improve the precision of tofor σ would take hints from the monitored branch, by trying to prove that some particular relational formulas are satisfied wrt. the major state. This would improve precision for the statically analysed branch.
Having derived a sound approximation of the interface between intervals and relational formulas, we can resume the derivation started in Equation (9), using Lemmas 7 and 8, to obtain a sound abstract static semantics.
Definition 4 . For all σ, σ ∈ States, the abstract static semantics I{|c| } σ,σ based on {|c| } ,Int is given by: Figure 4 introduces the abstract monitoring semantics we derive for the hybrid monitor relying on intervals. Most abstract transfer functions are similar to the ones introduced for the purely-dynamic monitor. Thus, we refer to Figure 2 and redefine only the ones that are different, namely conditionals and loops. The main difference concerns branching commands, since we rely on the novel abstract static analysis of Definition 4. 
This monitor is sensitive to runtime values. It deduces new relational formulas for high branching commands, by comparing the major state with the results of an interval static analysis. Consider for instance the program in Listing 2, that is inspired by Müller and al. [46] . Despite being modified in conditional branches that depend on a high guard, variable seed does not leak sensitive data. Unlike the hybrid flowsensitive monitors of Le Guernic et al. [41] and Russo and Sabelfeld [51] , as well as the ones we introduce previously in Sections V-A and V-B, our monitor relying on an interval analysis determines that all minor states agree with the major state on the value of variable seed -at the merge point of the conditional, which corresponds to labelling this variable as low. Our hybrid monitor is similar in spirit to the hybrid monitor of Besson et al. [16] that is also able to deduce that variable seed does not convey any knowledge about sensitive data, by relying on a constant propagation static analysis. [46] VI. RELATED WORK Abstract interpretation has been used for static analysis of noninterference in a number of works including Kovàcs et al. [39] , where security is explicitly formulated as 2-safety. Giacobazzi and Mastroeni show how abstract interpretation can be used to reason about downgrading policies and observational power of the attacker [34] . Here we focus on related work that addresses the challenge areas for IF monitoring identified in Sec. I: expressive policy, precision versus performance, and assurance of correctness.
To facilitate expression of the range of practical IF policies, researchers have proposed language based approaches that use types and other program annotations to label channels and for downgrading directives [6] , [11] , [20] , [21] , [47] , [52] , [56] , [59] . In various ways, policies can refer to meaningful events and conditions in terms of program control and data state (including instrumentation to express policy [20] ). Relational Hoare logic features assertions that express agreement or "low indistinguishability", enabling direct specification of conditional and partial dependency properties [1] , [4] , [14] , [49] . A strength of the logic approach is that it can offer precise reasoning about complex data and control structures [3] , [12] , [49] . For endto-end semantics of IF policies, epistemic formulations are effective [5] - [7] , [10] and have been connected with relational logic [11] . Such a connection is evident in the IF property of [23] , although it is not formalized there.
The generality and expressiveness of relational logic comes at the cost that it does not inherently enforce desirable constraints on policy. For example, consider the policy that the initial value of card number is secret, but the low four digits may be released upon successful authentication between merchant and customer. The relevant condition could be asserted at a point in the code where the release takes place, together with assumed agreement on the expression ccnum%10000, but the policy analyst could also assert that ccnum refers to its initial value at this point -assert B(ccnum = oldcc) where oldcc is a variable set to the initial value of ccnum and not changed.
Concerning precision of purely dynamic monitors, the basic technique of No Sensitive Upgrade (NSU) [8] , [58] has been refined [9] , [17] and several implementations exist [18] , [24] , [37] , [53] . Experience suggesting NSU is too impreciserejecting many secure executions -led Hedin et al. [37] to augment their monitor with static analysis of modified locations that heuristically suggests label upgrades, while relying on NSU for soundness. Hybrid monitors typically feature static analysis of modified variables. For the simple while language, a simple approximation is to find all assignment targets [41] , [51] . For more complex data structure this requires memory abstraction [45] . For more precision it is better to take into account the actual low values [40] . The term "value-sensitive" is used by Hedin et al. [37] and Bello et al. [13] for the use of low values in the major run to determine the observable modifications.
As our third monitor shows, there is a second important way in which precision can be gained by sensitivity to low values. This is also done by Besson et al. [16] who propose a generic hybrid monitor for quantitative information flow by tracking the knowledge about sensitive data that is stored in each program variable. Their monitor is also parametrised by a static analysis. The monitors we derive by relying on abstract interpretation share some similarities with their monitors. Indeed, they also model a purely-dynamic monitor by a static analysis that replies with top, forcing the monitor to treat high branching commands pessimistically. Additionally, their monitors do not rely on labelling the program counter with a security context. For formal assurance of IF monitor correctness, several works provide detailed formal proofs [37] , [53] ; some are machine checked [15] , [33] , including Besson et al. [16] . Our work relies on the framework of abstract interpretation for the systematic design and derivation of security monitors. We hope our work will pave the way for the formal verification of practical security monitors, by reusing some of the recent developments in formal verification of abstract interpretation analysers [32] , [38] , [50] .
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose an ideal monitor as a variation of a collecting semantics. We prove that this monitor enforces noninterference, for policies expressed using relational formulas, to which many other policy formalisms can be translated. We also conjecture (following Theorem 1) a relation with the security property proposed in [23] and taking into account intermediate assumptions (for downgrading) and assertions (for modularity and intermediate output). We would like to prove that conjecture, and strengthen it to account for intermediate assertions in divergent major runs. We believe this can be done using either transition semantics or trace based denotational semantics.
The ideal monitor is a specification that serves for deriving monitors that are sound by construction. We derive three monitors that illustrate various ways of tracking low indistinguishability and other relational formulas between states for high branchings. Although we provide a systematic approach by which precision can be fine tuned, we do not systematically evaluate the precision of the derived monitors. Several notions of evaluation have been proposed in the literature, using terms such as permissiveness and transparency. Bielova and Rezk [19] disentangle these notions. In their terms, precision in our sense -allowing more secure executions -is termed "true transparency".
A benefit of monitoring, relative to type systems or other static analyses for security, is the potential to leverage runtime values for precision. Almost all prior work uses valuesensitivity, if at all, as a means of improving precision to determine modifiable locations. An exception is Besson et al. [16] who rely on constant propagation to delimit implicit flows based on actual values. A similar result is provided by our value-sensitive hybrid monitor using interval analysis. We rely on a classical notion in abstract interpretation, reduced product [29] , to formalize the interactions between both the dynamic and the static part of the monitor. Lemma 7 and Equation (9) in particular are key results. By defining a Granger's reduced product, we can immediately leverage other off-the-shelf static analyses, such as polyhedra [31] , trace partitioning [44] , and constant propagation. Existing monitors already incorporate such complex static analyses that are spawned during or before the monitored execution [16] , [42] , [43] . Two challenges remain for the adoption of IF monitors: scaling them to complex and richer languages, and lowering the incurred overhead. We believe this paper makes a dent wrt. the first dimension, by linking the design of information flow monitors to the design of static analyses by the wellestablished theory of abstract interpretation [28] . As to the second challenge, we would like to investigate what static information can be pre-computed and how a monitor can take advantage of such information (beyond the easy case of modified variables in a toy language).
